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The so-called double-aging phenomenon – steadi-
ly decreasing birth rates coupled with ever increas-
ing life spans – has turned the developed world’s
age pyramids into age mushrooms.Low birth rates
mean fewer people paying for ever larger legions
of old folk for an ever increasing number of years.
Much has been said about the effect of this on
pensions, but the effects on health care are equal-
ly precarious. What is the situation in Europe?
What is being undertaken to stave off a melt-
down? What can we learn from the experience of
other countries?
Birth rates have been trending down for a long
time. Figure 1 shows a century of information for
four countries with readily
available data. The baby boom
was a large temporary reversal
in that pattern, resulting in a
rapid decline in birth rates after
its end. Mortality rates have
also trended down for a long
time.The drop in child mortali-
ty was very important for the
increase in life expectancy at
birth. And declining mortality
at adult ages has added greatly
to remaining life expectancy,
measured both from an age typ-
ical for the start of work and
from an age typical for retirement. Figures 2 and 3
show a century of remaining life expectancy for
four countries at ages 21 and 65. Thus, the ratio of
the population over 65 to that between 20 and 64,
commonly referred to as the old-age dependency
ratio,has shown an upward trend for a long time,as
shown in Figure 4. That trend is projected to con-
tinue and, in some countries, to be more rapid.
Hence the aging of the population and the antici-
pated continued aging.
Accompanying the long-term trend to longer adult
lives has been a long-term trend to shorter working
lives, to earlier retirement ages, as shown in Figu-
re 5.And it is not just at ages typical of retirement
that labor force participation of men has been
declining,but also at prime working ages as well,as
shown in Figure 6 for the US. Indeed, the decrease
in work is not just measured in terms of years of
work, but also the length of the work day, the work
week, and the work year.The pattern for women is
more complex as changing work roles for women
have been combined with the same underlying
trend.
Given at least a century of these trends, it is natur-
al to ask why aging has become a major issue in
pension design over the last two decades. By basic
accounting, any pension system, whether fully, par-
tially or not funded,must adapt in some form to this


















Source: Mitchell (1998a and 1998b).
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Figure 1
* I am grateful to Maisy Wong for re-
search assistance in preparing this paper.CESifo Forum 3/2007 29
trend in mortality and retire-
ment. The same levels of contri-
bution rates, monthly benefit
levels, and retirement ages are
not mutually consistent with dif-
ferent demographic patterns. In
response to aging, it is necessary
to have some combination of
increased contribution rates,
decreased monthly benefits, and
a later starting age for paying
benefits. This is true whatever




also respond to the changing old-
age dependency rate. Key here is
not the demography of the entire
population, but the “demogra-
phy” of the covered population.
At times, increases in coverage
have implied a different financial
picture than would be suggested
by overall demography. But in
advanced countries, coverage is
now complete or nearly so, so
that a further increase in cover-
age is not a significant option and
so population demography is a
key driver.
And fully-funded and partially-
funded systems must also
respond to changes in wages and
interest rates, which can be
affected by the demographic
trends. I suspect that globaliza-
tion and the increasing develop-
ment of poorer countries will be
far more important for wages and
interest rates than the demo-
graphic trends.
Adjusting benefits
Most advanced countries now
have payroll tax rates that are
sufficiently high that they are not
considering significant further
















Source: USA: Berkeley Mortality Database; other countries: Human Mortality Database.
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Source: USA: Berkeley Mortality Database; other countries: Human Mortality Database.





Figure 4I will focus on the other two variables, the level of
benefits and the ages at which benefits can be
claimed.1 To frame the options, consider the adapta-
tion to demography of a mandatory fully-funded,
defined contribution pension system that bases
annuities on market pricing. In this case, all of the
adjustment would be in terms of the monthly benefit
for any given retirement age. And the adjustment
would be automatic, not requiring changes in the
pension system rules. Of course, workers could
choose to work longer in order to have larger
monthly benefits. And the size of the benefit
increase for a given delay in the start of benefits
would also automatically adjust to changing life
expectancies. It would take changes in the rules to
raise the earliest age at which benefits could be start-
ed or to raise the contribution
rate. Either of those might make
sense if the replacement rates –
monthly benefits relative to past
monthly earnings – became too
low to be doing a good job of
fulfilling the social needs that
the pension system is trying to
address.
Similarly, a defined benefit sys-
tem, with or without some
assets, could adjust benefits
automatically based on mortali-
ty data (with or without a mor-
tality projection). This is the
approach taken in the hybrid
defined benefit system called a
Notional Defined Contribution
system, and has been imple-
mented in Sweden, with quasi-
actuarial adjustments. And the
Swedish approach also adjusts
the increase in benefits for a
delay in the start of benefits on a
quasi-actuarial basis. The
Swedish approach to increasing
benefits for a delay in their start
is an excellent way of avoiding
excessive implicit taxes on con-
tinued work, which unfortunate-
ly encourage too much early
retirement and plague many sys-
tems.2 Some system of automatic adjustments for life
expectancy seems to me a valuable part of pension
design.And the lack of such adjustments has been a
major part of the financial concerns generated by the
demographic trends.
But an adjustment for remaining life expectancy, by
itself, is not necessarily sufficient for financial stabil-
ity with decreased growth in the payroll tax base and
thus in revenues. So Sweden has also incorporated
an adjustment in the pension system’s notional inter-
est rate based on the financial position of the system.
This can further reduce future benefits to limit the
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1 In contrast, together with Peter Orszag,
I have called for tax increases to be part
of the adaptation to longer life expectan-
cy in the US (Diamond and Orszag 2005).
2 Excessive implicit taxes on continued work have plagued some
retirement systems.But a zero implicit tax on continued work is not
part of an optimal system providing insurance and redistribution.CESifo Forum 3/2007 31
risk of inadequate finances. And Germany has
included an adjustment of benefits for the system’s
dependency rate.
While useful, putting a pension system completely
on automatic pilot for its finances may inhibit revis-
iting design to better fulfill the social goals of the
pension system. For example, if pensions in pay-
ment increase more slowly than wages, as can hap-
pen with price indexing of benefits in force, longer
lives after retirement mean that the lagging of pen-
sions behind wages becomes more important. Or a
system that includes a minimum pension might find
it appropriate to revisit the size of the minimum.Or
evolving relative life expectancies of men and
women, along with evolving patterns of marriage
and divorce, might call for reexamining the way the
pension system works for all present and past fam-
ily members.
Another approach, taken in the US in 1983, is to
reduce future benefits based on projections of
future life expectancy. I think this approach is not
as good as automatic adjustments since there is
great uncertainty about future mortality. Indeed
there is considerable debate among demographers
and actuaries about the likely trend in future mor-
tality.Several recent reform proposals in the US do
incorporate automatic adjustments for life ex-
pectancy.
Automatic changes in benefits based on life
expectancy should follow three principles. First, the
rules should relate to the date of birth not the date
of retirement. Otherwise many workers will retire
just before a reduction in the benefit formula in
response to improved mortality. Such an incentive
to retire is inefficient. Second, changes should be
made annually. Otherwise the system will produce
large changes in benefit levels across nearby
cohorts. Such large changes are inequitable, as ben-
efits will differ more significantly between those
born in successive calendar years, some of whom
are born just days apart. Large changes are also
more difficult to sustain politically. And third, it is
better to have explicit rules for changing benefits,
rather than relying on some group to review and
adjust them in light of experience. Greater pre-
dictability and decreased political pressures seem
better with automatic adjustment with given rules.
Nevertheless, there always remains the option of
legislation to change whatever the automatic rules
produce.
The earliest age for starting benefits
If benefits vary with the age at which they start in a
roughly actuarial way, then increasing the age at
which benefits can first be claimed with no other
changes does not significantly impact the finances of
the system.To see the interaction between the earli-
est pension age and finances, let us consider the sys-
tem in the UK. Currently, the earliest pension age is
65 and if a worker chooses to delay the start of ben-
efits until age 66,the monthly benefit is increased by
10.4 percent. To increase the earliest pension age
without also reducing benefits at ages when they can
still be claimed, eligibility to claim benefits could
start at 66 rather than 65, without reducing the size
of benefits paid as a function of the age at which they
start at 66 or beyond. In contrast, the 10.4 percent
increase in benefits for the first year of delay in ben-
efits beyond age 65 could be removed, with or with-
out denying the ability to claim (reduced) benefits at
age 65. By eliminating the right to claim benefits at
65 without lowering benefits at 66 and beyond, the
pension system has lower expenditures for workers
at 65 (since benefits are not being paid) and higher
expenditures for those 66 and beyond (since more
workers are receiving the 10.4 percent increase for
not starting benefits at 65). The net impact on
finances, on a present discounted value basis, is not
large (indeed it is zero if the benefit increase is strict-
ly actuarial).Thus,the earliest pension age should be
based on fulfilling its social role, on seeing that pen-
sion levels are adequate and are available by the
time a significant fraction of the population should
sensibly be receiving them. Unfortunately, the UK
uses the same variable, the State Pension Age, for
these two separate functions – the earliest age for
claiming benefits and the key parameter for deter-
mining benefits. Thus it is not simple to change the
two separate functions on different schedules, as
should probably be the done.
Mandatory pension systems are mandatory
because of a concern that left to their own devices
too many workers would not save adequately for
retirement.This concern does not fully go away as
workers age and is the basis for judging what
would be a good earliest age for claiming benefits.
Increasing the earliest pension age from 65 to 66
would hurt some workers who ought to start bene-
fits at 65, given their job opportunities, financial
position and life expectancy (including the position
of their spouses).On the other hand,increasing the
earliest age for claiming benefits helps workers
Panel 2who would start benefits at 65 but would be better
off if they waited until 66, because of the increase
in annualated benefits (possibly their only annuity)
and possibly because working another year, given
available options,is worthwhile for improving their
remaining lifetime finances.Choice of an appropri-
ate earliest age for claiming should balance these
two factors.
If replacement rates shrink in response to longer
lives, it becomes plausible that a better earliest pen-
sion age is a later one. But, I have not seen any
appealing simple principle for adjusting the earliest
pension age in step with life expectancy. Such a link
would need to be based on an expectation of how
much longer people who retire early should work in
response to lower mortality rates. But the age at
which it is sensible for a worker to retire depends on
more than just life expectancy. It depends as well on
a worker’s ability to work, interest in work, and the
availability of jobs. All of these will change as mor-
tality decreases, but not necessarily in a simple rela-
tion to life expectancy. A sensible retirement age
also depends on the extent to which, because of the
trend to higher earnings, workers are more interest-
ed in retiring earlier. Furthermore, the diversity in
the labor force and the appropriateness (in some
cases the need) for some workers to take early
retirement also underscore the importance of pre-
serving some early retirement options. And future
declines in mortality will widen the variance in ages
at death. And they may continue to involve more
rapid rates of decline in mortality rates for higher
earners. These factors, if anything, increase the
importance of providing an option of early retire-
ment for those with shorter life expectancy.
There may be a perceived political gain from hiding
a cut in monthly benefits (from any given starting
age) by increasing the earliest pension age and pro-
viding the same benefit as had been provided at the
earlier age. But that is a cut in monthly benefits at
any given age of starting benefits.Apart from its pol-
itics, the choice of an earliest pension age should be
based on fulfilling its social role.
Early retirement and unemployment
Some people think encouraging early retirement is
a good way to reduce unemployment. But that is a
fallacy that ignores the reaction of the supply of jobs
to the supply of labor. When more workers are
available, firms are more willing to hire because
suitable labor is easier to find and equilibrium earn-
ings tend to be somewhat lower. The century-long
trend to earlier retirement, noted above, has not
been accompanied by a matching decline in unem-
ployment.
This trend suggests that greater income levels (both
higher earnings and access to better investment
opportunities) are a key driver of retirement deci-
sions.Yet the details of pension systems also matter
greatly. This has been found in the comparative
studies of pensions and retirement in 11 countries
by a team led by Jonathan Gruber and David Wise
(Gruber and Wise 1999). In particular they employ-
ed a simple measure of the incentives inherent in
pension rules by calculating an implicit tax on earn-
ings; that is, the decrease in expected lifetime
income as a consequence of the pension rules
should a worker continue earning for another year.
The studies in the Gruber-Wise volume calculated
such implicit taxes for each of the 11 countries in the
project.And they defined a variable they named the
“tax force” by adding up the implicit taxes from the
age at which a male worker becomes eligible to
claim a retirement benefit up to age 70.3 In a crude,
aggregate way, this variable measures the extent to
which the design of the pension system contains a
financial incentive to do less work, reflecting both
the earliest age for starting benefits and the implicit
taxes thereafter.
To see how this measure of retirement incentives is
related to retirement across their sample of coun-
tries, they used a simple aggregative labor supply
measure. For each age between 55 and 65, they cal-
culated the fraction of the male population not in the
labor force and then added up these fractions over
these ages. They named the variable “unused pro-
ductive capacity.” Regressing unused productive
capacity on the logarithm of the tax force, there is a
strong correlation and a sizable, statistically signifi-
cant coefficient, as shown in Figure 7.4 Moreover,
time series evidence and analyses based on individ-
ual data suggest that at least a large part of this cor-
relation is causation from implicit tax incentives to
early retirement.
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3 The focus here on male labor force experience recognizes that
increases in female career patterns that have marked many coun-
tries in recent decades have varied in timing and size across coun-
tries, making it harder to isolate the impact of pension rules on
labor supply by analysis across countries.
4 At the mean, the elasticity of unused capacity with respect to tax
force is 0.36.CESifo Forum 3/2007 33
Thus the implicit taxes from the pension plan have a
strong effect on retirement. One can then check
whether they also have a strong effect on unemploy-
ment by regressing male unemployment rates, mea-
sured by a decade long average unemployment rate,
on the same variable – the log of the tax force.
Whether interpreted as the impact of implicit taxes
from pensions on unemployment or as an instru-
mental variables measurement of whether early
retirement affects unemployment, the answer is
clear – there is no effect, as shown in Figure 8 (see
also Diamond 2006).
Thus it is a mistaken policy to have very high implic-
it taxes that strongly encourage early retirement
(and which may affect the pension system long-
term) as a response to unemployment which is gen-
erally shorter term and not sys-
tematically improved long-term.
Discouraging work by high
implicit taxes is an example of
large inefficiencies (deadweight
burdens) which do not accom-
plish social goals and should be
avoided.
Increased funding
What is the role of increasing the
funding of pensions for dealing
with the demographic trend? As
indicated above, a fully funded
pension system needs to adapt to
changing demography as well.
The extent of the needed change for longer lives is
similar to that of an unfunded system. The change
needed in an unfunded system for slower labor force
growth is replaced by the change needed for lower
interest rates,if that should happen.Thus the essence
of increasing funding for the mandatory system is to
distribute the costs of adapting across revenue
sources as well as benefit cuts and to distribute the
patterns of benefit cuts and tax increases differently
across generations. Funding may also alter the polit-
ical viability of different kinds of changes, possibly
for the better or for the worse. Of course, some indi-
viduals will sensibly respond to lower replacement
rates in the mandatory system by increased volun-
tary savings, and such a response is sensibly encour-
aged by tax policy.
Economists recognize that the
real gain from the funded de-
fined contribution (DC) ac-
counts is a change in intergener-
ational distribution; that a wide-
ly-made argument of higher
returns from funded DC ac-
counts is not a legitimate argu-
ment. Let me present and cor-
rect that argument. Some ana-
lysts and politicians compare the
long-run return on assets with
the long-run return in a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) system, which,
as is well known, is the rate of
growth. Since long-run rates of
return exceed rates of growth,
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Source: Gruber and Wise (1999).
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Figure 8pure gain.But it is wrong to ana-
lyze policy by considering only
the long run, not including the
short-run costs and benefits. It
would be wrong to say that hav-
ing the rate of interest exceed
the rate of growth implies that a
funded system is better. A full
analysis shows that there is no
gain available for everyone
from funding per se, but an
intergenerational redistributi-
on, which may be worthwhile or
may not be worthwhile.
This correct argument can be
seen by considering the infinite-
horizon present-discounted-
value (PDV) budget constraint for social security.
Basing benefits on individual accounts does not
change this constraint per se – taking some social
security revenues and moving them into funded indi-
vidual accounts leaves behind a revenue gap.
Combining the need to fill this revenue gap with the
other effects of creating the accounts leaves the PDV
constraint roughly unchanged. The overall rate of
return, which equals the rate of interest on assets,
minus the extra taxes needed because of the revenue
gap, is equal to the rate of growth, just as before. In
contrast, raising revenues or lowering benefits do
change the future PDV constraint. And obtaining a
higher rate of return on whatever assets the system
holds changes the PDV constraint as well.
There are two aspects to increased funding, both of
which matter. One is the growth of national capital
and the other is the fiscal (or
accounting) position of social
security. More growth of na-
tional capital increases resourc-
es available in the future; a
stronger fiscal position for
social security affects the politi-
cal process that allocates costs
and benefits in the future. So,
economists tend to favor fund-
ing that increases national sav-
ings, not funding that is merely
re-labeling or shuffling liabili-
ties.To this end,increased fund-
ing within social security should
not be offset by larger govern-
ment deficits outside social
security.
Medical expenditures
Turning to the expense of medical care, the issue is
more complex for two reasons. One is that the
impact of longer lives on medical costs depends on
the changes that occur in the pattern of health
across different ages. Hence different assumptions
about improved health imply different rates of
growth of medical expenses. The second reason is
that aging alone does not explain all of the medical
care cost growth we have experienced or anticipate
experiencing. The steady changes in medical tech-
nology, indeed the revolution in biology, have pro-
found implications for both the quality of medical
care that can be delivered and its cost. While in
principle ongoing research and development could
raise or lower the cost of medical care, it seems to
me that the future is likely to resemble the past,
with better medical care resulting in greater expen-
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Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006).
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ditures. Figure 9 shows the historic pattern for the
over-65 population in the US. Similarly, projections
of medical expenses note that aging alone is only a
portion of anticipated cost increases, as shown in
Figure 10. This makes it important to focus on the
details of incentives (on both demanders and sup-
pliers) to use medical care, incentives that affect
prices of medical services, and incentives for
research and development.
As a closing note, let us remember that projections
are just projections and the future is uncertain.Thus
systems need to be adaptive, to some extent auto-
matically adaptive, rather than designed for a partic-
ular future, one that may not occur.
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PANEL
In addition to the above speakers, the panel, which
was chaired by Martin Wolf, Associate Editor and
Chief Economics Commentator of Financial Times,
consisted of experts from business, interest groups
and the public administration.
Edward Palmer, Professor of Social Insurance
Economics, Uppsala University, stressed that the
current EU projection assumes a long-run fertility
rate of 1.5 children per woman for the EU-25.
Demographic risks caused by increasing longevity
and low fertility can be managed to a large extent
“if countries’ social systems – especially pension
policy and family policy – are appropriately
designed to accommodate not only today’s but also
tomorrow’s demographic and economic realities”.
Apart from a family policy that subsidizes child
birth and supports female labor force participation,
a well-designed pension system is urgently needed
that counterbalances the effects of increasing
longevity and low fertility on pensions. Both, the
financial defined contribution (FDC) scheme and
the non-financial defined contribution (NDC)
scheme accomplish this, albeit in different ways.
Moreover, the defined contribution (DC) schemes
seem to have the advantage over the defined bene-
fit (DB) schemes.The DC schemes are amenable to
flexible retirement, which can promote longer
working careers for older workers, while they are
neutral with respect to labor mobility.
Hans Rudolf Schuppisser, Confederation of Swiss
Employers, presented the Swiss government’s
future strategy to overcome the financial shortages
caused by the rapidly changing demography.“At the
moment the Swiss government is trying (1) to sta-
bilise its health insurance system, (2) to find a solu-
tion for the old age pension system by introducing
the retirement wage of 65 for both women and men
combined with a slower revaluation of pensions (the
1st pillar) as well as by lowering the conversion rate
of occupational pension plans from the current
7.1 percent to 6.4 percent in 2014 (the 2nd pillar),for
example.”A discussion about raising the retirement
age to 67 is not on the agenda at the moment. For
years his organisation has recommneded the intro-
duction of a higher official retirement age in the
next decade and an improved combination of chil-
dren day-care facilities and school system in
Switzerland.
Craig L. Fuller, Executive Vice President of APCO
Worldwide,Washington DC,reported the serious US
problems related to the financing of the social insur-
ance system. “Today the ratio of workers to social
security beneficiaries is 3.3 to 1 in the US. And, in
2040 there will be two workers for each beneficiary.
At the beginning of this year the US Social Security
Trustees suggested that the annual sum of social
security benefit payment will exceed the flow of tax
income into the system starting in 2017. Thereafter
the Trust Fund assets held by the Treasury will be
utilised;however,they are projected to be exhausted
in 2041.” Furthermore the US Medicare programme
paid benefits of $402 billion in 2006 while yielding
income of $437 billion. Quoting the recent report of
the US Medicare Trustees he argued that the
Hospital Insurance Trust fund is also expected to be
exhausted in 2019 and the financial outlook for the
Medicare programme continues to raise serious con-
cerns in the US.
Panel 2Peter Schnabel, General Director of the Social and
Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands in The
Hague, pointed out that there are several types of
social security systems in the OECD which include:
the liberal,Anglo-Saxon type,the corpora-tist/conti-
nental model, the social-democratic/Nordic regime,
the system prevalent in the Mediterranean countries
and that in the new, modern EU states in Eastern
Europe.Examples of social security systems that are
the most vulnerable but are also quite flexible in
adjusting to future needs appear to be the corpo-
ratist regimes that are presently in effect in coun-
tries like Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and
France. He added that the pension systems do not
always run parallel to the social security systems.
They can be organised publicly or privately, capital-
based or tax-based, coverage can be universal or
selective, they can offer low or high level pensions,
and be partly voluntary and partly mandatory.In his
opinion, pensions are likely to become a serious
problem sooner in those countries where the
absence of a capital-based system is combined with
universal coverage and generous allowances. Apart
from the cases in France and Germany this has also
recently emerged as a sensitive political issue in the
Netherlands.
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